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SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
The successful experience of administrative agencies in applying
liberal rules for the admission of evidence' is clearly reflected in the
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that any evidence may be
received, so long as 'it is not irrelevent, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.
2
However, the administrative agencies' progressive approach to evidence
problems has not been directed solely to the question of admissibility.
Even more significant, because of its greater influence on the final
decision, is the agency's freedom to determine what kind of evidence
may support its findings.3 Illustrative is the recent decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in American Airlines v.
Civil Aeronautics Board,4 allowing the CAB to rely heavily on specula-
tive evidence in exercising its broad regulatory powers.
The CAB, following lengthy hearings, granted temporary certifi-
cates of public convenience and necessity to four non-scheduled airliners
authorizing them to engage in air transportation of cargo only.5 From
the evidence before it, the Board concluded that there was an air freight
traffic "potential" of not less than one billion ton-miles annually. 6 Hav-
ing little previous experience in this undeveloped field,7 the CAB, in
1. See DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 447 (1951). The author points to three
fundamental tendencies: "(1) to replace rules with discretion, (2) to admit all evi-
dence that seems relevant and useful, and (3) to rely in making findings upon 'the
kind of evidene& on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious
affairs."' Id. at 448.
2. 60 STAT. 242, 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1946).
3. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 1, at 448.
4. 192 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
5. In 1946, 14 applications were made to engage directly in air freight transporta-
tion. There were also 78 applications for permission to participate indirectly as air
freight forwarders. In the hearings on the direct cargo carriers, with which this case
is particularly concerned, several established airlines intervened in opposition to the
applications.
6. There was a wide margin of variance in testimony on this particular point,
ranging from the CAB's finding to an estimate of more than 5 2 billion ton-miles
offered by one expert witness. The CAB recognized that this tremendous potential is
subject to many uncertainties, and would therefore necessitate intensive development
if. it is to be realized.
7. The air freight industry owes its inception primarily to the exigencies of
World War II. In the interim between the hearings and the issuance of a report
thereon, the. CAB promulgated an exemption order, pursuant to statutory authority,
which permitted immediate engagement in cargo-only transportation pending its final
decision on certification. Thus, while there was some previous experience to draw
from, it was severely limited. For an extensive discussion of the problems in develop-
ing the air freight industry and suggestions as to how to best resolve them, See
Durham and Feldstein, Regulation as a Tool in the Development of the Air Freight
Iidustry, 34 VA. L. Rav. 769 (1948). The authors are especially critical of the estab-
lished airlines who have taken advantage of the administrative processes of the CAB
NOTES
reaching this finding, drew largely on expert opinion as to market
potential, data pertaining to property movement by express and rail, and
testimony concerning the effect various rates would bear on future
growth of this new enterprise. In jtistifying its action, the agency
stressed that the promotional character of the issue in question defied
solution in the same manner as the trial of factual issues by a judicial
tribunal.8 The circuit court upheld the Board's determination, grounding
its sweeping opinion on the legislative mandate,9 the prospective nature
of the problem which necessitated the utilization of forecasts, and the
expertness of the regulatory body, which possesses its maximum utility
in this kind of situation.10
The Civil Aeronautics Act requires the CAB to consider as being
in the public interest the "encouragement and development of an air
transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs""'
of the country. This explicit mandate is peculiar to the Aeronautics Act
insofar as transportation statutes are concerned.' 2  However, while this
provision is an important consideration in ascertaining whether the Board
has remained within the framework of statutory guidance, it does not
limit the applicability of the American Airlines opinion to CAB decisions.
The court's language militates against such a narrow interpretation.'
3
in an attempt to stifle progress in this infant industry. They, suggest that permanent
certificates be issued qualified freight carriers without further delay. Otherwise, they
fear, interest groups such 'as the Air Transport Association of America, a trade group
of certificated airlines, will obstruct the achievement of the progressive transportation
policy enunciated in the Civil Aeronautics Act.
8. In answer to the invervenors' protest that the factual evidence was too
insubstantial to justify issuance of the certificates, 'the Board said in its opinion:
.. . it is essential in disposing of the present case that we keep in mind the nature
of the basic issue involved. That issue is primarily promotional in character and relates
to developmental rather than purely regulatory purposes. This characteristic of the
statutory scheme serves to distinguish the Civil Aeronautics Board from judicial
tribunals and even from many regulatory bodies." American Airlines v. Civil Aero-
nautics Board, 192 F.2d 417, 420,421 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
9. 52 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (1946) (Civil Aeronautics Act).
10. See American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 192 F.2d 417, 420 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
11. 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1946).
12. The National Transportation Policy enunciated by Congress in 1940 admittedly
includes the fostering and development of an adequate transportation system. 54 STAT.
899 (1940). This pronouncement, however, does not specifically attach the promo-
tional aspects to the granting of a certificate of public convenience and necessity as
is done in the Civil Aeronautics Act. But the sections dealing directly with the
issuance of permissive certificates do not confine the agency to past or present conditions.
For example, part II of the Interstate Commerce Act provides: ". . . a certificate
shall be issued . . . if it is found that . . . the proposed service, to the extent
to be authorized by the certificate, is or will be required by the present or future
public convenience and necessity .... " 49 STAT. 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 307 (1946)
(emphasis added).
13. "Every new bus route, new airplane service, new radio station, new stock
issue, new pipe line, new power project, and so on, seeks its permissive certificate
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Further, the absence of similar directives in other statutes concerning
the issuance of permissive certificates has not precluded other agencies
from relying upon prognostication. 4 Thus, while the policy section in
question furnishes a useful guide to the agency operating under its au-
thority, to attribute to it the entire rationale of the American Airlines
case would seem to be unwarranted over-emphasis.
If the policy enunciated by the Act is not the sole basis for approval
of the CAB's order, under what circumstances does an administrative
determination founded partially upon speculation meet the Substantial
evidence requirement which permeates the regulatory process when
agency action must be based on a record built at hearings ?15 The Attor-
ney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure posed a similar
question in discussing the desirability of detailed judicial review of ad-
ministrative rules.' The Administrative Procedure Act, as finally passed,
divided the administrative process into two broad categories-rule-mak-
ing and adjudication.' 7 It has been common to characterize the former
as that segment of the process which is akin to legislation, and the latter
as similar to judicial determination of a controversy.'" The Attorney
General's Committee recognized that certain agency regulations might
of necessity be based upon speculative considerations.' 9 However, it does
not necessarily follow that speculation, if permitted at all, is limited to
upon the basis of future possibilities." American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
192 F.2d 417, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
14. See notes 25 and 28 infra, and accompanying text.
15. When either rule-making under Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act
or adjudication under Section 5 is required by statute to be based on a record built at
hearings, Section 7(c) provides: ". . . no sanction shall be imposed or order be issued
except ... as supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence." 60 STAT. 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1946).
16. "One crucial point is whether the courts would be willing to regard as sub-
stantial the opinion evidence and the possibly somewhat speculative and partial data
upon which some of the findings would necessarily rest-especially the economic
findings and findings relating, for example, to consumer preferences or reactions to
food products and their labels." REP. A-rr'y GEN. Com. AD. PROC. 119 (1941) (here-
after referred to as FINAL REPORT). The Committee conclhded that little could be
gained by a detailed judicial review of such findings by judges inexpert in the solution
of such problems. Ibid.
17. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act is concerned with the rule-
making function, while Section 5 addresses itself to administrative adjudication. That
these categories are not mutually exclusive is lucidly pointed out in DAvis, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 190, 193.
18. See DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 184. After drawing the analogies, Professor
Davis immediately mitigates their utility and suggests that it is often best to omit the
nomenclature and deal with the problem in question on a practical basis. Id. at 185.
See Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HAv. L. REv. 259 (1938),
for an illustration of the point that- mere prospective operation does not necessarily
distinguish rule-making from adjudication.
19. FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 119.
NOTES
the rule-making function. Illustrative of the attendant inconsistencies
in such a conceptualistic approach is the Administrative Procedure Act's
express designation of licensing as an adjudicatory proceeding. 20 The
issuance of certificates of necessity is a part of the licensing function. 2'
That the considerations which enter into such a determination are not
solely within the narrow confines of the factual issues generally before a
judicial tribunal is readily apparent from the American Airlines decision.
Several years prior to the American Airlines case, United Airlines,
Inc., v. CAB 22 upheld the decision of the CAB to grant a certificate of
necessity to one of two competing applicants for a new passenger route.
The Board had found that Western Airlines must be awarded the cer-
tificate if it were to remain a competitive element in the section of the
country where the new route was located. From past and present traffic
loads, the agency made estimates of probable future traffic, projecting
the available data to include the long-term secular growth trend of air
travel. It further speculated that Western's operations would be profita-
ble; that if the route were given to the other applicant it would result
in serious economic injury to Western. The court alluded to the subject
matter in dispute which required the use of "intelligent conjecture,"
since the "core of facts" was not sufficient to preclude the necessity for
such prophecy.23 Again, as in the American Airlines case, the nature
of the problem defied adequate resolution in any other manner.
The instances in which agency action has been held to be supported
by substantial evidence although such evidence included speculative fore-
casts have not been restricted to aeronautics problems. The Interstate
Commerce Commission during World War II granted a permissive cer-
tificate to a steamship company to engage in water transportation, of
autos upon resumption of their manufacture following the cessation of
hostilities. The ICC order was reversed by a federal district court, which
characterized as conjectural the Commission's conclusion that to refuse
the certificate might cause unnecessary delay in shipping the vehicles
once civilian production were resumed, adversely affecting the public
interest.24 The Supreme Court,2 5 however, restored the agency's decision,
20. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d) (1946).
21. Id. § 1001 (e).
22. 155 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
23. "Any forecast of the result of a new venture contains a core of certainty
and a margin of conjecture. If the venture is clos6ly similar to established operations,
the core is large and the margin small. If there is no experience data on major
elements, the margin of conjecture is considerable." Id. at 174.
24. Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Co. v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 81, 86
(E.D. Mich. 1944).,
25. United States v. Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U.S. 236 (1945).
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pointing to the governing statute26 which makes necessary forecasts
as to the future. The lower court's approach, it was felt, would "paralyze
the Commission into inaction." 27
Similarly, in issuing a certificate of necessity to a carrier of
petroleum products to operate in a territory already being served, the
ICC specifically found that the consequent competition would stimulate
improved service to the public, and that the established carrier's economic
status would not be seriously impaired. The Commission relied upon
the growth and anticipated increase in the territory's population, the
expected rise in the volume of business of those concerns which would
utilize the pyoffered service, and the belief that traffic in petroleum prod-
ucts would expand along with the increase of tourist trade once wartime
rationing of gasoline ended. The reviewing tribunal, in upholding the
administrative grant of the requested certificate, referred to this evidence
as -typical of offerings made in such cases. The ICC was "exercising an
expert judgment or discretion with respect to a transportation question,"
and the courts will interfere only if agency action is arbitrary or ca-
pricious. 28
The usefulness of administrative forecasting has also been recog-
nized in areas other than those involving the certification of new ventures.
In rate-fixing, there is likely to be more factual data available to the
governing agency than when the issue is one of determining whether the
public interest requires the initiation of a particular service. Neverthe-
less, it would be unrealistic to assume that rates can be intelligently
determined without serious thought being given to their future conse-
quences. The Supreme Court has held that it is' not a denial of due
process for the regulatory body to draw inferences as to the probable
effect a rate increase will have on future traffic.29 The Commission had
concluded that the carrier in question would not be benefited in the long
run from a rate above a certain level because a higher tariff would dis-
courage patronage. To the claim that the order was invalid because
based on speculation and conjecture, the Court replied that the setting
of future rates necessarily includes making predictions. ". . . [I]t is
26. 54 STAT. 941 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §909(c) (1946) provides: ". . . upon
application . . . the Commission shall issue a certificate to any qualified applicant ...
if the Commission finds that . . . the proposed service . . . is or will be required
by-the present or future public convenience and necessity. . . ."
27. United States v. Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U.S. 236, 241
(1945). "Forecasts as to the future are necessary to the decision." Ibid.
28. Lang Transp. Corp. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 915, 921 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
See also Inter-City Transp. Co. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 441- (D. N.J. 1948).
29. Market Street Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of State of Calif., 324 U.S.
548 (1945). See also Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546-547 (1942).
554
NOTES
not forbidden by the Constitution that there be a pragmatic test of
matters which even the most expert could not know in advance." 30
Though rate-making was the particular function to which the court
addressed itself, there is no compelling reason to suppose that a different
Constitutional result would be reached in connection with the issuance
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Both are predictive
functions, embracing many of the same considerations.
Predictions of future events by administrative agencies have not
been confined to situations dealing primarily with regulation of a par-
ticular business, but have been relied on also when the chief concern is
with the formulation of policies which will directly affect the general
public. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 3' provides that the
Federal Security Administrator may promulgate regulations establishing
"standards of identity" for various food products in the promotion of
honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers. 2 The Adrminis-
trator must base such rules "only on substantial evidence of record. '33
Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats34 furnishes an interest-
ing exafnple of the problems involved in effectuating the avowed statu-
tory purpose. After hearings, the Administrator promulgated regula-
tions designed to prevent possible future consumer confusion as to certain
30. Market Street Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm. supra note 29, at 569. An
objection was also raised that the Commission's predictions were made without the
aid of expert testimony. The Court pointed out that even if such opinions were offered,
they would not bind the agency, since it must evaluate such offerings. The absence,
then, of expert opinion other than that of the regulatory body was not violative of due
process. The Court carefully distinguished the issue here involved, in which the basis
for the judgment was contained in the record, from that where agency action is based
on evidential facts gathered by the agency but not cited in the record, thus foreclosing
opportunity to challenge them. The latter has been held a violation of due process.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937). Professor
Davis describes the Market Street case as "a typical example of a merger of specialized
knowledge with an exercise of judgment", but he feels that even then the parties should
be made aware that this is being done. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 1, at 514.
31. 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 301, et seq. (1946).
32. Id. § 341.
33. Id. § 371 (e). The Administrator also must set forth detailed findings of fact
upon which orders are based. Ibid. For a criticism of the imposition of strict procedural
requirements embodied in the Act, see Fuchs, The Formulation and Review of Regula-
tions Under the Food, Drug, and Comietic Act, 6 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 43 (1939).
He predicted that due to the subjective nature of the considerations in this area, the
usual basis for reversal of the Administrator's findings would be their arbitrariness
rather than the lack of substantial *evidence to support them. Willapoint Oysters v.
Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949), is an excellent illustration of this proposition. The
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure saw little benefit in a
detailed court review, and therefore did not favor additional legislation which would
require close judicial scrutiny of the administrative process in this area. FINAL REPORT,
mtpra note 16, at 119.
34. 318 U.S. 218 (1943).
. 555
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food ingredients.3 5  The circuit court of appeals, in setting aside the
regulations, described the evidence relied upon as "speculative and con-
jectural."3' 6 The court acknowledged that it was not within its province
to substitute judgment, but did so anyway, prophesying that the regula-
tion would not achieve the desired end.3 7 The Supreme Court, takipg
into account the prospective function here involved, deferred to the ad-
ministrative judgment, which it found to be based on substantial evi-
dence.38 It is thus apparent that the Administrator's efforts to further
the statutory purpose are not to be invalidated merely because it cannot
be proven at the outset that regulations so adopted will in fact produce
the desired result.39
The courts have exhibited considerable deference in their review
of administrative action based larg&ly on speculative evidence. As previ-
ously mentioned, the substantial evidence rule is the governing criterion
for judicial review of administrative action based on a record built at
hearings.40  The rule, howe er, is of little value in the abstract, taking
on significance only when applied to particular situations. Its utility
even then seems minimal when, as here, the primary considerafions are
not factual.
The problem of ascertaining what role the judiciary must assume
when reviewing administrative determinations based in part on con-
35. Expert nutritionists and representatives of consumer organizations had testi-
fied that consumers, due to their lack of knowledge about ingredients, were being
exploited by the sale of foods described as "enriched."
36. Quaker Oats Co. v. Federal Security Administrator, 129 F.2d 76, 82 (7th
Cir. 1942). In support of the regulations, the Administrator found that if a standard
were not devised, the existing situation might become worse and tend to confuse the
public, thus impeding the promotion of honesty and fair dealing in its behalf.
37. ". . . [T]he regulations, while purporting to be in the interest of consumers,
do not promote honesty and fair dealing in their behalf." Id. at 83. It is difficult
to see how this conclusion could be reached without benefit of actual experience,
which could only be gained by allowing the regulation to stand.
38. "The exercise of the administrative rule-making power necessarily looks to
the future. . . . [T]here was sufficient evidence of 'rational probative force' to support
the Administrator's judgment that in the absence of appropriate standards of identity,
consumer confusion would ensue." Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats,
318 U.S. 218, 228 (1943).
39. One commentator on this subject has struck out at what he calls the occasional
"apparent acceptance of sheer speculation as substantial evidence." Austern, The
Formulation of Mandatory Food Standards, 2 FooD DRUG COSMaETIC QUARTERLY 532,
587 (1947). He did not, however, point to any specific instances where such practices
have occurred. Assuming that an agency would promulgate a regulation devoid of any
factual basis, it is inconceivable that a reviewing court would permit such action to
be given effect.
40. See note 15 supra. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1950),
held that appellate courts, in reviewing administrative determination, must scrutinize
the entire record to ascertain whether the findings are substantially supported. For a
discussion of the effect of this requirement on the scope of review, see Note, 26 IND.
L.J. 406 (1951).
NOTES
jecture is not susceptible of articulate delineation. There seem, however,
to be three interrelated, interdependent factors which have influenced
judicial acceptance of such determinations: (1) the prospective function
with which the agencies are dealing; (2) the practical necessity to specu-
late so that problems of this nature may be realistically and adequately
solved; (3) the competence of the agency to make wise use of this type
of evidence because of its experience in dealing with problems which
require its utilization.
The Prospective Function. As opposed to the trial-like determina-
tion of rights based upon the course of past events, the administrative
process is often called upon to further future developments in the public
interest, such as the certification of new ventures; the improvement of
established services; and the promulgation of regulations not solely for
the purpose of correcting past errors, but to facilitate the achievement
of a generally desired end such as that enunciated in the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. While there need not always be an express
statutory command that the agency consider the future effects of its
orders, Congressional recognition of the prospective nature of the
agency's function is frequently persuasive. As was said in the American
Airlines case, ". . . when a prospective rule is required to be upon evi-
dence, that evidence must be construed to include estimates, or forecasts,
or opinions, on future events." 41
Practical Considerations. Often, problems confront a regulatory
agency which make it necessary to indulge in conjecture, speculation,
and experimentation if intelligent action is to be taken at all. The need
to predict exists either because the situation requiring solution is novel,
or for the reason that no amount of previous experience can furnish an
adequate solution without inquiring into the future. Where past data
are available, to dogmatically insist upon a precise mathematical projec-
tion of such experience would be to ignore the growth of a dynamic
society. For example, can it be proven with mathematical exactness the
number of ton-miles of air freight which will be transported in 1953?
Can the effects of a rate change upon a carrier's revenue be predicted
in dollar amounts? Can it be absolutely shown now that a new bus
route will aid in developing an industrial area, which will increase
demand for residences, thereby providing a bus company with enough
patronage to make the route an economically sound venture? Can if be
factually demonstrated that the admission .of a new carrier into a specific
territory will or will not lead to the .economic ruin of the established
41. American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 192 F.2d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
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carrier? Can it be unequivocally stated that a particular requirement
pertaining to the identification of food products will prevent consumer
confusion wxhich might otherwise ensue? All of these questions must be
answered in the negative. Were if otherwise, the resort to prophecy
would be wholly unwarranted. In any event, the reliance upon such
imperfect means of solution must persist in order that complex problems
of a progressive society be solved quickly and as well as possible. It is
therefore essential that allowances be made for experimentation in those
areas in which even the experts must deal with imponderables.
Administrative Competence to Wisely Use Speculative Evidence.
Administrative "expertise" is in reality the touchstone of deference to the
administrative process. 42 It is the expertness of the agency which is the
true foundation for its exercise of discretion.43 Professor Freund, an
early administrative law writer, defined administrative discretion to
include "a determination . . . reached in part at least upon the basis of
considerations not entirely susceptible of proof or disproof. ' 44  Even
though he advocated strict limitations on the use of such discretionary
powers, 45 Freund admitted that "discretion enlarges as the element of
future probability preponderates over that of present conditions." 46 It
follows that when the primary task is one of predicting future happen-
ings in order to properly accomplish the statutory objective, the breadth
of discretionary power will be even greater than when the agency is
confronted with the task of exercising judgment upon the basis of known
facts.47
Obviously, the ability of agencies to speculate does not give them a
license to disregard the factual evidence presented. No matter how novel
the problem confronting the agency, it will include a basis of fact. The
42. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Con-
parative Analysis, 58 HARv. L REv. 70 (1944), points out that matters are reposed in
the administrative process largely to "secure the advantage of expertness and special-
ization." Id. at 81, 82.
43. Id. at 100. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 117; Fuchs, Concepts and
Policies in Anglo-Amnerican Administrative Law Theory, 47 YALE L.J. 538 (1938).
44. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE PowERs OVER PERsoNs AND PROPERTY 71 (1928).
45. Id. at 80.
46. Id. at 71. Freund describes the consideration of future advantages and dis-
advantages of a particular course of action as the exercise of "prudential discretion."
Here the primary considerations are usually speculative, hence, the scope of discretion
is necessarily broad. Id. at 72, 73.
47. In an attempt to articulate the considerations which influence reviewing courts
in ascertaining the desirability of substitution of administrative judgment, Professor
Davis opined that one important factor, seldom embodied in the opinion, is the
tribunal's respect for the particular agency's competence. Thus when it appears that
the regulatory body has given careful attention to the problems before it, judicial.
interference is less likely than when the agency seems to have done a hasty or inadequate
job. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 1, at 927.
NOTES
necessity for entering the realm of conjecture will vary, depending in
large part upon the breadth of the factual core. The size of the core will
of course differ within a given field, depending upon the particular cir-
cumstances. For example, in the air-cargo .problem experience was prac-
tically non-existent, and as a result opinions on future contingencies were
a major source of the CAB's evidence in granting the temporary cer-
tificates. Over a period of years, however, as the industry develops,
valuable information and experience will doubtless be obtained so that
future applications can be judged upon a somewhat sounder basis. In
short, the nucleus of facts will be enlarged, thereby reducing, though not
eliminating, the need to speculate.
The factual basis will also differ widely depending upon the type of
forecasting function involved. It is likely to be broader when the task
is one of fixing rates for an established carrier than where the problem
is to determine whether a new endeavor should be initiated. Again the
reason is that in the former situation there will generally be a back-
ground of accumulated experience data, narrowing the margin for con-
jecture.
It is manifest that the governing agency cannot be permitted to
ignore the factual evidence before it. Fanciful crystal-gazing must not
be mistaken for intelligent speculation. If, for example, past facts indi-
cate' a trend toward a decreasing need for bus transportation along a
route already being serviced, the regulatory body would not be justified
in permitting a new carrier to enter and compete with the existing one
on the ground that the situation might improve. As the American Air-
lines opinion cautioned, "governmental permissions for the future can-
not be fashioned from pure fantasy, speculation devoid of factual
premise."'48
The most difficult problem. lies in the region between the situation
which necessitates the resort to a future forecast and that which by
nature precludes its use. This uncertain area can best be described as that
in which there are not enough factual data to pursue a course of action
without speculation, but by postponing the decision facts can be obtained
which will appreciably narrow the margin of conjecture. The question
here is whether an agency should be permitted to speculate when the
necessity to do so may be considerably lessened by delaying action until
more facts can be gathered.
The Supreme Court apparently feels that agency action may be
based in part on speculation, even though postponement may elicit factual
48. American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 192 F.2d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir.
1951).,
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knowledge sufficient to reduce greatly the need to prognosticate, so long
as the decision is not arbitrary nor capricious. 4 9 For several years the
Federal Communications Commission had been considering the promul-
gation of a single set of standards for color television. RCA and CBS
were conducting experiments in an effort to perfect their respective
systems. RCA's plan, if it could be achieved, admittedly was more de-
sirable both from an economic and scientific standpoint. The CBS sys-
tem, however, was nearer perfection when the FCC promulgated
regulations which in effect adopted its scheme and precluded the RCA
plan. In reaching this decision, the FCC admitted relying heavily "on
speculation and hope rather than demonstration. "50 It nevertheless re-
fused to stay the effective date of the order so that RCA could present a
professed improvement. The Supreme Court held that although the
Commission's action may have been unwise, the matter was one of dis-
cretion which the FCC did not abuse. 51 Justice Frankfurter, not prone
to meddle with the administrative processes, vigorously disagreed with
the Commission mainly because of the technological nature of the prob-
lem evidently feeling that in this swiftly advancing domain it is foolish
to shut out experimentation, particularly where the public interest is
greatly affected by so doing.52
In support of the agency's determination, it can be argued that its
action was not hasty, but came after years of testing; that after all, at
some point positive action must be taken. The argument can also be
made, though it is somewhat less persuasive, that the public interest de-
manded immediate production of color television though it may prove to
be more expensive and less efficient than the system presumably in the
process of being perfected.
On the other hand, it is a reasonable contention that the FCC, by
preferring to speculate, in effect cut off further testing in a field where
the public interest could be better served by additional experimentation.
In the situations discussed previously, sensible 'olutions to the particular
problems could not be attained without experimentation made possible
only by positive agency action. Demands for air freight transportation
could not be accurately measured until the CAB inaugurated the service
by licensing cargo carriers. Whether an additional truck-line over a
certain route will seriously impair the established company's economic
49. Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
50. Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 660, 672, (N.D. Ill. 1950).
The dissenting judge pointed to the "fluid state of the art" and declared that the
speculation and hope had not been exercised in the public interest. Id. at 672.
51. Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
52. Justice Frankfurter predicted that the FCC's prognostications "will be falsified
in the very near future." Id. at 427.
NOTES
return can ultimately be determined only by permitting the new carrier
to operate. The effect of a given rate upon traffic and income cannot
be finally discovered until the rate is put into operation. Postponing
agency action in these situations may facilitate accumulation of some ad-
ditional facts, but will not obviate the necessity to speculate when a de-
cision is eventually made.
The distinguishing feature of the RCA case, then, is that agency
action based on speculation foreclosed rather than fostered further ex-
perimentation. There is thus no ready-made formula which can be
applied with equal propriety in passing upon all eventualities. When this
predicament presents itself the final judgment must be adapted to the
circumstances of the particular case. The Supreme Court's approach to
this perplexing problem is perhaps defensible because of its reluctance
to interfere with administrative judgment. However, administrative
agencies should be extremely cautious in their reliance upon predictions
when functioning in this problematic area.
The American Airlines case cannot fairly be said to represent a
departure from principles governing this realm of the regulatory process.
The significance of -the opinion lies in its flexible and practical approach
to the operation of the administrative system. There is no reason to
believe that the decision is an invitation to regulatory agencies to discard
traditional methods of supporting conclusions. The resort to intelligent
speculation remains a necessity to sound prospective action, rather than
an expedient for the avoidance of the factual core present in all situa-
tions confronting the administrative process.
WARRANTIES TO A PAYOR OR ACCEPTOR UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-417 (1)
Endeavoring to erect a basic legal structure upon which business
transactions can be predicated, the draftsmen of the proposed Uniform
Commercial Code have not only reiterated many concepts previously in-
corporated in uniform commercial acts, other statutes, and judicial de-
cisions, but they have also introduced numerous significant innovations.1
The aggregate of these provisions purports to simplify, modernize, and
consolidate the entire body of rules of commercial law. As the Nego-
1. References to sections of the Code are to the Final Text Edition (November,
1951), as approved by the American Law Institute, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, and the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association; references to comments by the Commissioners are to the Proposed Final
Draft (Spring, 1950).
